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The puzzling idea that the combination of independent estimates of the magnitude of a quantity
results in a very accurate prediction, which is superior to any or, at least, to most of the individual
estimates is known as the wisdom of crowds. Here we use the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadel-
phia’s Survey of Professional Forecasters database to confront the statistical and psychophysical
explanations of this phenomenon. Overall we find that the data do not support any of the proposed
explanations of the wisdom of crowds. In particular, we find a positive correlation between the
variance (or diversity) of the estimates and the crowd error in disagreement with some interpreta-
tions of the diversity prediction theorem. In addition, contra the predictions of the psychophysical
augmented quincunx model, we find that the skew of the estimates offers no information about the
crowd error. More importantly, we find that the crowd beats all individuals in less than 2% of the
forecasts and beats most individuals in less than 70% of the forecasts, which means that there is a
sporting chance that an individual selected at random will perform better than the crowd. These
results contrast starkly with the performance of non-natural crowds composed of unbiased forecast-
ers which beat most individuals in practically all forecasts. The moderate statistical advantage of a
real-world crowd over its members does not justify the ado about its wisdom, which is most likely
a product of the selective attention fallacy.
I. INTRODUCTION
The wisdom of crowds usually refers to the notion that
a collection of individuals – the crowd – can solve prob-
lems better than most individuals within it, including
experts [1]. The idea was brought to light by Galton’s
1907 analysis of a contest to guess the weight of an ox at
the West of England Fat Stock and Poultry Exhibition in
Plymouth [2, 3]. Despite being more than a century old,
the wisdom of crowds is still a subject of fascination for
lay people and scientists as well. This fascination stems
from reports of the remarkably accurate appraisal pro-
duced by the statistical average of independent estimates
of the magnitude of an unknown quantity. For instance,
in the ox-weighing contest, the crowd overestimated the
weight of the ox by less than 1% of the true weight [2].
There are a few attempts to explain the wisdom of
crowds using purely statistical arguments. The first idea
that comes to mind is that the individual estimates are
unbiased, that is, that the errors spread in equal propor-
tion around the true value of the unknown quantity so
that they cancel out when the estimates are combined
together [4, 5]. Although it is hard to accept the nonex-
istence of systematic errors on the individual estimates,
this explanation is rather popular perhaps because its
underlying assumption is difficult to verify [6].
A somewhat more sophisticated explanation for the
wisdom of crowds is offered by the diversity prediction
theorem [7], which asserts that the error of the collective
estimate is never greater than the average individual er-
ror. Moreover, as hinted by its name, the theorem has a
say in the role of the diversity of the individual estimates.
In fact, since it asserts that the quadratic collective error
equals the average quadratic individual error minus the
diversity of the estimates, one is tempted to think that
the increase of the diversity would improve the crowd ac-
curacy, which harmonizes neatly with the zeitgeist of the
21st century [7].
In addition to the statistical explanations, there is a
psychophysical model of the wisdom of crowds, viz., the
augmented quincunx model of probabilistic cue catego-
rization [8], which assumes that there exists a typical
value of the estimated quantity that is common knowl-
edge of the population. The real object, say, Galton’s ox
is then compared with the prototypical object through a
number of perceptible cues that may be categorized in-
correctly by the individuals. The main prediction of the
model is that the collective error can be inferred from the
skewness of the distribution of the estimates [8].
In order to test the predictions, as well as the rele-
vance, of the aforementioned explanations for the wis-
dom of crowds, we use forecasts of economic indicators
that are publicly available in the Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia’s (FRBP) Survey of Professional Forecast-
ers [9]. As this database offers quarterly projections of
the economic indicators, we can tune the difficulty of the
forecasts by controlling for the forecast range. We find
that the collective error, the diversity and the skew of the
estimates are affected significantly by that range. Most
interestingly, we find that the difficulty of the forecast is
typically associated with a large variance and a long left
tail of the distribution of estimates.
Overall we find that the data do not support any of the
proposed explanations for the wisdom of crowds. First,
contra the diversity prediction theorem, we find a positive
correlation between the collective error and the diversity
of estimates. Second, we find that, once the range of
the forecasts is accounted for, the skewness of the dis-
tribution of estimates does not influence significantly the
crowd accuracy, contra the predictions of the augmented
quincunx model. Third, we find that the unbiased esti-
mates assumption confers on the crowd an enormous ad-
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2vantage over the individuals within it, which is at great
variance with the data.
Our main finding, which was obtained using almost
104 forecast experiments for several economic indicators
in the FRBP forecast database, is that only rarely the
crowd beats all individuals within it. More precisely, this
happens in less than 2% of the forecast experiments that
we analyzed. In addition, the crowd beats most individ-
uals within it in less than 70% of our experiments, which
means that there is a sporting chance that an individual
selected at random will perform better than the crowd.
Clearly, the purely statistical advantage of the crowd over
its members does not justify the high esteem it enjoys,
which is most likely a product of the selective attention
fallacy.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In sec-
tion II we offer an outline of the main ideas used to ex-
plain the wisdom of crowds, viz., the diversity prediction
theorem [7], the augmented quincunx model [8] and the
unbiased estimates assumption [4]. In section III we de-
scribe briefly the FRBP forecast database [9] from where
we have extracted the forecast experiments. In section IV
we present and analyze the results of those experiments
in the light of the known explanations for the wisdom
of crowds. In the Appendix we replicate those forecast
experiments using virtual unbiased agents so as to ver-
ify the predictions of the unbiased estimates assumption.
Finally, section V is reserved to our concluding remarks.
II. THREE FRAMEWORKS FOR
UNDERSTANDING THE WISDOM OF CROWDS
Here we describe briefly three frameworks that claim
to explain the wisdom of crowds, viz., the diversity pre-
diction theorem, the augmented quincunx model and the
unbiased estimates assumption. These proposals make
a variety of specific predictions that will be tested using
the FRBP forecast database in section III.
A. The diversity prediction theorem
The diversity prediction theorem is viewed as a main
achievement to those allured by the idea that the per-
formance of groups can be boosted by increasing the di-
versity of their members [7], although even simple agent-
based models indicate that the effects of diversity can be
rather unpredictable in nontrivial problem-solving sce-
narios [10]. This theorem shows that the quadratic col-
lective error is related in a very simple manner to the
average quadratic individual error and to a measure of
the diversity of the estimates. More pointedly, let us de-
note by gi the estimate of some unknown quantity by
individual i = 1, . . . , N , and by G the true value of the
unknown quantity. The collective estimate is defined as
the arithmetic mean of the individual estimates, that is,
〈g〉 = 1
N
N∑
i=1
gi, (1)
as usual. We note, however, that Galton used the me-
dian of the individual estimates as the crowd estimate in
his seminal ox-weighing experiment [2], though the arith-
metic mean proved to be a much better estimator in that
case [3]. Thus, the collective error is defined as
γ = G− 〈g〉. (2)
Defining the average quadratic individual error as
 =
1
N
N∑
i=1
(gi −G)2 (3)
and the diversity of the estimates as
δ =
1
N
N∑
i=1
(gi − 〈g〉)2 , (4)
we have the identity
γ2 = − δ, (5)
which is Page’s diversity prediction theorem [7]. It as-
serts that the quadratic collective error equals the aver-
age quadratic individual error minus the prediction diver-
sity. This result is sometimes viewed as indication that
the increase of the prediction diversity δ results in the
decrease of the quadratic collective error γ2. Of course,
since δ and  cannot be varied independently of each
other, this interpretation is not correct. Nevertheless,
the relationship, if any, between the diversity of the esti-
mates and the collective error is a very interesting issue
that can be investigated using a large number of equiva-
lent forecast experiments, which is the approach we fol-
low in this paper. We note that the diversity of estimates
δ is known in the statistical literature as the precision of
the estimates, that is, the closeness of repeated estimates
(of the same quantity) to one another [11].
We stress that the diversity prediction theorem guar-
antees only that the quadratic collective error γ2 is never
greater than the mean quadratic individual error . As
we will see in section III, this is not a very useful result
from the practical perspective since, for instance, it does
not imply that the crowd is better than most individuals.
In particular, we will report an experiment where the col-
lective estimate is worse than the estimate of about 85%
of the individuals. Hence, γ2 ≤  does not imply that
it is always advantageous to favor the collective estimate
over the estimate of a randomly chosen individual in the
group.
As an amusing side note, we mention the resemblance
between the discussions about the value of the diversity
prediction theorem and the arguments about the rele-
vance of the celebrated Price equation for evolutionary
3biology [12]. We note that Price’s equation, which has a
straightforward derivation from the definition of fitness,
is considered by many researchers as a mere mathemati-
cal tautology that has no predictive value at all [13].
It is not possible to investigate the influence of the di-
versity of the estimates on the collective error using a
single forecast experiment since the values of γ,  and
δ are fixed for a particular experiment. The solution is
to consider a large ensemble of roughly equivalent ex-
periments and to look at the correlations between those
quantities. This can be achieved artificially by selecting
random subsamples of the estimates of a single exper-
iment to produce many virtual experiments with fewer
estimates than the original one [14]. The problem with
that approach is that the resulting virtual experiments
are not independent. Here we use the FRBP forecast
database to collect the independent forecast experiments
necessary for the correlation analysis. We note that since
the collective estimate 〈g〉 and the true value G may have
different values for different experiments, it is necessary
to introduce the dimensionless quantities γ/G, 1/2/G
and δ1/2/〈g〉 to properly compare the experiments.
B. The augmented quincunx model of judgment
The augmented quincunx is a psychophysical model of
probabilistic cue categorization [8], whose name was in-
spired by a probability device invented by Galton in 1873
to demonstrate the central limit theorem [15]. The ba-
sic idea behind this model is the assumption that there
is a typical value of the unknown quantity that is com-
mon knowledge gained through experience. For instance,
in the ox-weighing experiment, it is assumed that the
population (or at least the participants of the contest)
share the knowledge that the typical weight of oxen is
Gˆ. In order to estimate the weight G of a particular ox,
the contestants focus on a number of perceptible cues
c = 1, . . . , C that are correlated with G (e.g., the height
of the ox or the degree to which its ribs are showing).
If a cue c indicates that the ox is heavier (lighter) than
the prototype ox then the typical weight is increased (de-
creased) by a factor ηc. Hence
G = Gˆ+
C∑
c=1
ηc, (6)
where ηc can be positive or negative depending on the
correlation between cue c and the ox weight. Stochas-
ticity enters the augmented quincunx model because the
contestants can perceive a cue incorrectly. More point-
edly, the estimate of contestant i is
gi = Gˆ+
C∑
c=1
ucηc, (7)
where uc is a random variable that takes on the value
+1 with probability p and the value −1 with probability
1−p [8]. This means that a cue is perceived correctly with
probability p and incorrectly with probability 1 − p. In
particular, if individual i can perceive all cues correctly
(i.e., p = 1) then its estimate is perfect (i.e., gi = G),
despite the fact that Gˆ 6= G. For simplicity, the model
assumes that all contestants are equivalent, i.e., the cue
categorization probability p is the same for all individu-
als.
Although Gˆ, C and ηc are hard to access quantities,
the augmented quincunx model makes some interesting
general predictions. For instance, the model predicts that
the collective error γ can be inferred from the degree and
direction of the skewness of the distribution of individual
estimates: estimate distributions have greater negative
(positive) skew when the mean estimate 〈g〉 underesti-
mates (overestimates) the true value G by greater margin
[8]. This claim means that there is a negative correlation
between γ/G and the skewness µ3. We recall that the
skewness µ3 of a distribution is a dimensionless measure
of its asymmetry, which is defined as
µ3 =
1
N
N∑
i=1
(
gi − 〈g〉
δ1/2
)3
, (8)
where δ is the variance and 〈g〉 is the mean of the distri-
bution of estimates.
We stress that it is only because of the prediction of the
augmented quincunx model that γ < 0 is associated to
µ3 > 0 and vice-versa that we have defined the collective
error as a signed quantity in equation (2). In fact, except
when testing that particular prediction, we will consider
the unsigned collective error |γ| throughout the paper.
C. The unbiased estimates assumption
A natural explanation for the wisdom of crowds in-
volves the well-known fact that the combination of un-
biased and independent estimates guarantees the accu-
racy of the statistical average, provided the number of
estimates is large (see, e.g., [4, 5]). In other words, if
the estimates made by numerous different people scatter
symmetrically around the truth, then the collective esti-
mate is likely to be very accurate. Of course, the trouble
with this explanation is the assumption that the indi-
vidual estimates are unbiased, that is, that their means
coincide with the true value of the unknown quantity.
If correct, this assumption would imply that one could
harvest the benefits of the wisdom of crowds by asking
a single individual to make several estimates at different
times (see, e.g., [16]). The unbiased estimates assump-
tion is the limit of the augmented quincunx model where
Gˆ = G and p = 1/2.
In the Appendix we use the unbiased estimates as-
sumption as a null hypothesis and replicate our analy-
sis of the FRBP forecast experiments by replacing the
expert economists by virtual unbiased forecasters.
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FIG. 1. Histograms of the number of participants in the 205
short-range forecasts (left panel), in the 203 medium-range
forecasts (middle panel) and in the 196 long-range forecasts
on the nominal gross domestic product of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Philadelphia’s Survey of Professional Forecasters.
III. THE FRBP FORECAST DATABASE
The Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s (FRBP)
Survey of Professional Forecasters offers quarterly pro-
jections for five quarters of a variety of economic indi-
cators [9]. In order to lighten the analysis, here we will
focus on semestrial forecasts of the nominal gross domes-
tic product (NGDP) mainly, as our conclusions apply to
the other indicators as well. In particular, we consider
the forecast for the current quarter, that is, the quarter
when the survey was conducted and the forecasts for two
and four quarters later. Henceforth we will refer to these
forecasts as short-range, medium-range and long-range
forecasts. We use the NGDP forecasts available in the
FRBP database from the fourth quarter of 1968 to the
fourth quarter of 2019. This amounts to 205 estimate
distributions for short-range, 203 for medium-range and
196 for long-range forecasts. All forecasters are select
economists and the mean number of forecasters in each
experiment is about 37. Figure 1 shows the histograms
of the number of participants N in each experiment for
the three forecast ranges. The minimum number of par-
ticipants is N = 9 and the maximum is N = 87 in any
forecast range.
The separation of the experiments on short-range,
medium-range and long-range forecasts allows the control
of the difficulty of the forecasts and the study of its influ-
ence on the distribution of the individual estimates. We
note that in Ref. [8] these distinct forecast ranges were
clumped together to form a single large forecast database
on the NGDP. We think, however, that this procedure is
not appropriate as the range of the forecasts has a major
effect on the distribution of the estimates, as we will see
next.
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FIG. 2. Scatter plots of the scaled diversity δ1/2/〈g〉 and the
relative collective error |γ|/G for the short-range (left panel),
medium-range (middle panel) and long-range (right panel)
NGDP forecasts. The filled symbols and the horizontal and
vertical lines indicate the means and the standard deviations.
The solid lines are linear fittings of the data.
IV. RESULTS
We begin our analysis with the study of the correlation
between the properly scaled crowd accuracy |γ|/G and
the diversity of the estimates δ1/2/〈g〉. Figure 2 shows
the scatter plots for the three different forecast ranges,
where each data point represents a particular forecast
experiment. We recall that each experiment produces a
distribution of estimates from where we extract the rele-
vant summary statistics. For instance, figure 3 illustrates
two distributions of estimates for the short-range forecast
scenario, which correspond to two different data points
in the left panel of figure 2. As already pointed out, since
the number of participants N as well as the NGDP true
value G may vary in different experiments for the same
forecast range (see figure 1), it is necessary to consider di-
mensionless summary statistics to properly compare the
outcomes of the experiments.
Figure 2 shows that the accuracy |γ|/G and the dis-
persion δ1/2/〈g〉 of the estimates vary considerably as the
forecast range increases, indicating that clumping those
forecasts together as done in Ref. [8] may not be a judi-
cious choice. In particular, the short-range forecasts are
on the average about three times more accurate and four
times less disperse than the long-range forecasts. This is
somewhat expected since the farther the forecast range,
the greater the odds that the predicted indicator will be
influenced by unforeseen factors.
The Pearson correlation coefficient between δ1/2/〈g〉
and |γ|/G is 0.24 for the short-range, 0.27 for the
medium-range and 0.16 for the long-range forecasts. The
unfounded interpretation of the diversity prediction the-
orem that associates a high prediction diversity to a low
collective error implies a negative correlation between
δ1/2/〈g〉 and |γ|/G, which is clearly not supported by our
findings. In fact, given that the forecasters are all expert
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FIG. 3. Histograms of the relative estimates gi/〈g〉 for two
short-range forecasts. The vertical red lines indicate the ratio
between the true value of the NGDP indicator and the crowd
estimate, i.e., G/〈g〉. In the left panel there are N = 40
participants and none of them fared better than the crowd,
whereas in the right panel there are N = 63 participants and
43% of them predicted more accurately than the crowd.
economists, it is somewhat intuitive to expect that the
less disperse their estimates, the closer they are to the
true value. For the long-range forecast, their expertise
becomes less influential to the success of the predictions
and so the positive correlation between collective error
and diversity decreases [17]. We note that the positive
correlation between these two quantities is a prediction of
the augmented quincunx model [8]. However, as shown
in the Appendix, this intuitive result holds also for the
unbiased estimates assumption, which produces a much
stronger positive correlation between δ1/2/〈g〉 and |γ|/G
than the original forecasts.
A nontrivial prediction of the augmented quincunx
model is the negative correlation between the (signed)
collective error and the skewness of the distribution of
estimates [8], which we assay in Figure 4 for the differ-
ent forecast ranges. The Pearson correlation coefficient
between µ3 and γ/G is 0.08 for the short-range, -0.01 for
the medium-range and -0.06 for the long-range forecasts.
The low values of these coefficients, as well as the wrong
sign in the short-range forecast experiments, point to the
little relevance of the skewness of the estimate distribu-
tions to the wisdom of crowds, in disagreement with the
claims of Ref. [8]. Nevertheless, these results show that
the skewness is strongly affected by the forecast range,
similarly to the dispersion of the estimates, although this
is barely seen in figure 4 due to the scale of the x-axis.
For instance, the x-coordinate of the center of mass of
the data is located at µ3 = −0.07 for the short-range
forecasts, at µ3 = −0.2 for the medium-range forecast
and at µ3 = −0.4 for the long-range forecasts.
Interestingly, our results suggest that the more difficult
the forecasts, in the sense that there are more room for
noise to alter the future outcome, the greater the vari-
ance and the longer the left tail of the distributions of
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FIG. 4. Scatter plots of the skewness µ3 and the (signed) rela-
tive collective error γ/G for short-range (left panel), medium-
range (middle panel) and long-range (right panel) NGDP fore-
casts. The filled symbols and the horizontal and vertical lines
indicate the means and the standard deviations. The solid
lines are linear fittings of the data.
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FIG. 5. Scatter plots of the skewness µ3 and the scaled di-
versity δ1/2/〈g〉 for short-range (left panel), medium-range
(middle panel) and long-range (right panel) NGDP forecasts.
The filled symbols and the horizontal and vertical lines indi-
cate the means and the standard deviations. The solid lines
are linear fittings of the data.
estimates. Figure 5 confirms this inference by showing
the scatter plot of µ3 and δ
1/2/〈g〉. In particular the
Pearson correlation coefficient between these quantities
is -0.16 for the short-range, -0.35 for the medium-range
and -0.37 for the long-range forecasts. This correlation
is not predicted by the augmented quincunx model since
the sign of the skewness is not affected by the variance
in that model [8]. We note that the unbiased estimates
assumption produces inconclusive results regarding the
correlation between µ3 and δ
1/2/〈g〉 (see Appendix).
We conclude our analysis by challenging the common
view that the crowd is superior to most of its integrants
[1]. In fact, if people believed that an individual selected
at random had a sporting chance of beating the crowd,
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FIG. 6. Histograms of the number of experiments for which
the fraction ξ of the individual estimates are more accu-
rate than the collective estimate for short-range (left panel),
medium-range (middle panel) and long-range (right panel)
forecasts.
the idea of the wisdom of crowds would probably never
have taken off. Here we address this issue quantitatively
by measuring the fraction of individual estimates that are
superior to the collective estimate for each forecast exper-
iment. The results are presented in form of histograms in
figure 6, where the height of the bars is the number of ex-
periments for which that fraction equals ξ ∈ [0, 1]. There
are a few experiments with ξ = 0 so that the crowd beats
all individuals and one short-range forecast experiment
where 85% of the individuals beat the crowd. The frac-
tion of experiments for which the crowd is less accurate
than the majority of the participants is 55/205 ≈ 0.27 for
the short-range forecasts, 58/203 ≈ 0.29 for the medium-
range forecasts and 66/196 ≈ 0.37 for the long-range fore-
casts. Hence, a randomly chosen individual has probabil-
ity greater than 1/2 of beating the crowd in about 30%
of the experiments reported here.
We stress that finding that 85% of the individuals beat
the crowd in a particular forecast experiment does not
contradict Page’s diversity prediction theorem, which as-
serts that the collective error is always less than the av-
erage individual error, i.e., |γ| ≤ 1/2. In fact, that ex-
periment involved N = 39 participants among which 4
outliers produced completely off the mark estimates re-
sulting in the inflation of the mean individual error. This
point betrays the fact that the theorem (5) is largely ir-
relevant for practical issues concerning the use or not of
the crowd as an effective forecaster.
To support these findings, in figure 7 we clump to-
gether 8650 experiments of the FRBP forecast database
without regard to the economic indicator (there are ten
distinct indicators) or to the range of the forecast (there
are five distinct ranges). We find that the crowd is su-
perior to any individual in only 1.7% of the experiments
(viz., those for which ξ = 0), whereas it is superior to
most individuals in 66.8% of the experiments (viz., those
for which ξ ≤ 1/2). Hence the widespread claims about
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
co
un
ts
FIG. 7. Histogram of the number of experiments for which
the fraction ξ of the individual estimates are more accurate
than the collective estimate. The data comprises the 8650
experiments of the FRBP forecast database for ten distinct
economic indicators and five forecast ranges.
the superiority of the crowd over the individuals [1] is
most likely an artifice of selective attention that gives
prominence to successful outcomes only. Those claims
are legitimate only for unrealistic crowds composed of
unbiased forecasters, as shown in the Appendix.
V. DISCUSSION
It is almost a cliche´ to remark that a group of coop-
erating individuals can solve problems more efficiently
than when those individuals work in isolation [18, 19].
Cooperation is, in general, a successful problem solving
strategy [20], though it is not clear whether it merely
speeds up the time to find the solutions, or whether it
alters qualitatively the statistical signature of the search
for the solutions [21, 22]. Yet, in some cases, cooperation
may well lead the group astray resulting in the madness
of crowds [23] or, less dramatically, it may simply un-
dermine the benefits of combining independent forecasts
[24, 25].
A rather peculiar manner to circumvent the potential
negative effects of cooperation while still benefiting from
the group intelligence is the so-called wisdom of crowds,
i.e., the notion that a collection of independently decid-
ing individuals is likely to predict better than individu-
als or even experts within the group [1], which ironically
seems to have become itself a piece of crowd wisdom [26].
The first report of this phenomenon in the literature was
probably Galton’s account of the surprisingly accurate
estimate of the weight of an ox given by the median of
the sample of the individual guesses [2].
Although much of the evidence of the wisdom of crowds
is anecdotal (see, e.g., [1, 6]), there are a few efforts aim-
ing at explaining this phenomenon either using a purely
statistical rationale [5, 7] or using psychophysical argu-
ments on the nature of the individual estimates [8]. Typ-
7ically, these approaches aim at inferring the quality of the
crowd estimate using information about the distribution
of individual estimates (see, e.g., figure 3), such as the
variance and the skew of the estimates. Here we ad-
dress the soundness of those explanations using forecasts
of economic indicators from the Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia’s (FRBP) Survey of Professional Forecast-
ers database [9]. The difficulty of the forecasts can be
tuned by controlling for the forecast range.
Our results suggest that the difficulty of the forecasts
is associated to large variances and to long left tails of
the distributions of estimates. In addition, we find that
a large variance is associated to a poor crowd accuracy,
in disagreement with the interpretation of the diversity
prediction theorem that the increase of the diversity of
the estimates leads to a decrease of the collective error
[7]. Moreover, when controlling for the forecast range,
we find no evidence of an association between the skew
of the estimates and the collective error, in disagreement
with the predictions of the augmented quincunx model
[8].
We pay special attention to the unbiased estimates
assumption that explains the accuracy of the crowd by
conjecturing that the errors of the individual estimates
spread in equal proportion around the true value of the
unknown quantity so that they cancel out when those
estimates are combined together [4]. In particular, in the
Appendix we replicate the forecast experiments by re-
placing the economists by (virtual) unbiased forecasters
and found that much of the hailed features of the wisdom
of crowds are properties of the combination of unbiased
forecasts instead.
The wisdom of real crowds is very different from the
apocryphal wisdom of crowds of unbiased forecasters.
For instance, the crowd beats all individuals in only
around 2% of the FRBP forecast experiments and it
beats most individuals in about 70% of those experi-
ments, whereas the corresponding figures for the unbi-
ased forecasters are about 16% and 100%, respectively.
Hence, since there is a sporting chance that a randomly
chosen individual will beat the crowd in real-world fore-
casts, the only explanation that we can find for the pop-
ularity of the wisdom of crowds is selective attention (or
cherry picking) that gives prominence to outcomes that
tally with Galton’s conclusions.
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FIG. A1. Scatter plots of the scaled diversity δ1/2/〈g〉 and
the relative collective error |γ|/G for short-range (left panel),
medium-range (middle panel) and long-range (right panel)
unbiased forecasts. The filled symbols and the horizontal and
vertical lines indicate the means and the standard deviations.
The solid lines are linear fittings of the data.
APPENDIX
In this appendix we examine the predictions of the un-
biased estimates assumption for the forecast experiments
considered in the main text. In particular, for each exper-
iment with a given number N of participants, we calcu-
late the variance of the estimates δ and use it to produce
N independent unbiased estimates distributed according
to a Gaussian of mean G (the true value of the economic
indicator) and variance δ, i.e.,
Pu (gi) =
1√
2piδ
exp
[
− (gi −G)
2
2δ
]
(A1)
for i = 1, . . . , N . Hence, by construction, the diversity
of the virtual unbiased estimates equals the diversity of
the economists’ forecasts. Although we split the data in
three forecast ranges, as done in the main text, we stress
that from the perspective of the unbiased forecasters the
only difference between those ranges is the variance δ of
the estimates. In addition, we note that for the values of
N considered here (figure 1), the arithmetic average 〈g〉,
equation (1), is expected to differ from G.
Figure A1 shows the scatter plots of δ1/2/〈g〉 and |γ|/G
for the unbiased forecasters. As expected, the crowd es-
timate in this case is about ten times more accurate than
in the original forecast experiments. The Pearson corre-
lation coefficient between δ1/2/〈g〉 and |γ|/G is 0.41 for
the short-range, 0.38 for the medium-range and 0.45 for
the long-range forecasts. Hence, the (positive) correla-
tion between the diversity of the estimates and the crowd
accuracy is more pronounced for the unbiased forecasts
than for the economists forecasts.
Figure A2 shows the scatter plots of µ3 and γ/G for the
unbiased forecasters. The noteworthy aspect here is the
small range of variation of the skewness values as com-
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FIG. A2. Scatter plots of the skewness µ3 and the (signed)
relative collective error γ/G for short-range (left panel),
medium-range (middle panel) and long-range (right panel)
unbiased forecasts. The filled symbols and the horizontal and
vertical lines indicate the means and the standard deviations.
The solid lines are linear fittings of the data.
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FIG. A3. Scatter plots of the skewness µ3 and the scaled
diversity δ1/2/〈g〉 for short-range (left panel), medium-range
(middle panel) and long-range (right panel) unbiased fore-
casts. The filled symbols and the horizontal and vertical lines
indicate the means and the standard deviations. The solid
lines are linear fittings of the data.
pared to that of figure 4. Of course, the nonzero values
of µ3 are due to the small number of estimates N in each
experiment, since the expected skewness of a Gaussian is
zero. The Pearson correlation coefficient between µ3 and
γ/G is -0.06 for the short-range, 0.11 for the medium-
range and 0.10 for the long-range forecasts. These coef-
ficients are similar to those of the real experiments and
their uncertain signs indicate that the skewness of the
estimates offers no information on the wisdom of crowds,
regardless of the nature of the forecasters.
An unexpected result of our analysis of the economists’
forecasts is the negative correlation between the diversity
and the skewness of the estimates (figure 5), which im-
plies that a large variance is associated to a long left tail
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FIG. A4. Histograms of the number of experiments for which
the fraction ξ of the individual estimates are more accu-
rate than the collective estimate for short-range (left panel),
medium-range (middle panel) and long-range (right panel)
unbiased forecasts.
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FIG. A5. Histogram of the number of experiments for which
the fraction ξ of the individual unbiased estimates are more
accurate than the collective estimate. The expert forecasts of
the 8650 experiments of the FRBP database were replaced by
virtual unbiased forecasters.
of the distribution of estimates. The results of figure
A3, which shows the scatter plots of µ3 and δ
1/2/〈g〉
for the unbiased forecasters, point to a different con-
clusion. In fact, the Pearson correlation coefficient be-
tween these quantities is -0.17 for the short-range, 0.16
for the medium-range and -0.08 for the long-range fore-
casts. Again, the low values and the inconsistency of the
signs of these coefficients suggest that the skewness plays
no role at all on the outcome of unbiased forecasts.
Although the previous scatter plots show only mild
quantitative differences between the economists and the
unbiased forecasters, the advantage conferred to the
crowd over its members differs starkly between these two
types of forecasters. Figure A4, which shows the his-
tograms of the number of experiments for which a frac-
tion ξ of individuals beat the crowd, illustrates this point.
9In fact, the most probable outcome is that the crowd
beats all individuals (ξ = 0) in the case of unbiased fore-
casters, in contrasts to our findings for the human experts
(figure 6).
Finally, figure A5 shows the results for the case that
all forecasts of the FRBP database are clumped together
and replaced by unbiased forecasts. In this case, the
crowd is superior to any individual in 16.3% of the ex-
periments (viz., those for which ξ = 0), whereas it is
superior to most individuals in 99.8% of the experiments
(viz., those for which ξ ≤ 1/2). Therefore, a crowd of
unbiased forecasters exhibits all the exalted attributes of
the wisdom of crowds, but a crowd of human experts
does not. Hence our qualms about the generality and
usefulness of that phenomenon.
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